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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
The problem of providing adequate criteria for situations such as those
involved in the invalid parts of the instant ordinance seems to border on
the impossible since any formula relating off-street parking requirements to
land uses must be sufficiently general to be applicable to diverse businesses
and yet sufficiently specific to meet the needs of the particular business
occupying the premises. The amount of traffic to two physically similar office
buildings, for example, may vary greatly because of the particular nature
of the business carried on within each building. This may also be true
of the traffic of commercial vehicles to different buildings. Possibly one
method, in the case of alterations to and expansions of existing buildings,
would be to require an estimate • of future traffic to the building based on
an average of the present flow of traffic multiplied by a ratio of presently
available floor space to future floor space, or some other similar mathe-
matical comparing factor. Entirely new buildings would have to be com-
pared to similar enterprises under like conditions. The difficulties of writing
such formulae into zoning ordinances effectively is obvious; however, mathe-
matical accuracy is not required, 8 and the parking provision would probably
be upheld, if there were at least some workable formula, not palpably un-
reasonable or illogical, by which the discretion of the- administrator might
be guided.
LAWRENCE J. KENNEY
Corporations—Executive Compensation—Deferred Compensation Unit
Plans.—Lieberman v. Koppers Co., Inc. 1—A corporate stockholder sued
to enjoin the continued operation of a "Deferred Compensation Unit Plan,"
on the ground that the capital gains provision of the plan was not reasonably
related to the value of the services rendered by those included within it.
Upon the death or retirement of a key executive, there was to be credited
to his "unit account" an amount equal to the net increment in market
value of one share of common stock, from the date the "units" were assigned,
multiplied by the number of "units" assigned. Payment of the amount was
to be made over a ten-year period following the executive's death or re-
tirement. On cross motions for summary judgment, the Court of Chancery,
New Castle, Delaware, held for the defendant; it cannot be said that ap-
preciation of the market price of common stock is unrelated to the efforts
of the individuals included within the plan.
Berkwitz v. Humphrey 2 is the only other case which has been litigated
testing the validity of the so-called "unit" plans. It was concluded there
that a plan, almost identical to the one in question, was per se invalid. It
was reasoned that, since the market price of common stock is subject to
many extraneous forces, i.e., fortunes of the economy, speculation, etc., there
8 Ibid. The Court allowed the approximate determination of the number of em-
ployees by a consideration of the floor space, the number of offices, and the purposes
for which the building was constructed.
Lieberman v. Koppers Co., Inc., 149 A.2d 756 (Del. Ch. 1959).
2 163 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ohio, 1958).
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is no reasonable relation between it and the value of a key executive's
services.8 In the principal case, however, it was pointed out that earnings
are the chief determinative factor of a stock's market price, at least in the
long run. There being no question that an executive's services are related
to corporate earnings, the court felt that it was unable to say that there is
no relation between those services and the market price of the corporation's
stock.
The latter view seems to be the better one. Compensation must be
reasonably related to the value of an executive's services, but the determina-
tion of what is reasonable is usually left to the discretion and business
judgment of the board of directors." In order to prevail, therefore, the
plaintiff would have to show that a reasonable man would find the "unit"
plan indefensible. Yet the "unit" plan is not unlike stock option plans
which have found approval in the courts.5 The financial reward in each
plan is identical, both being based on the increase of the market price of
the corporation's stock. It is difficult, therefore, to understand why the
"unit" plan is more unreasonable than a stock option plan. In the opinion
of this commentator, the view expressed in Lieberman v. Koppers Co., Inc .°
is clearly justifiable.
CHARLES C. WINCHESTER, JR.
Criminal Law—Partnerships--Statutory Construction—United States
v. A f P Trucking Co. et ai. 1—The United States appealed directly to the
Supreme Court, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731, 2 from rulings of the U.S.
District Court of New Jersey dismissing two in formations3 charging partner-
ships as entities with violation of 18 U.S.C. § 835 and 49 U.S.C. § 322(a). 4
The basis of the dismissal in each case was that a partnership as an entity
is not subject to criminal liability under the statutes. On appeal' the
Supreme Court, Harlan, J., unanimously held that there is nothing in the
nature of a partnership as an entity to exempt it from criminal responsibility
where Congress intended it to be so responsible. So holding, the court
faced the further problem of whether or not Congress by these statutes
intended partnerships to be criminally responsible. Traditionally partner-
ships qua partnership have been, and still are at common law, regarded
3 Id. at 86.
4 Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343, 349-351 (D. Del., 1948) ; Clamitz v. Thatcher
Mfg. Co., 158 F.2d 687 (2d Cir., 1947) ; Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 680
(1941).
Wyles v. Campbell, ibid.; Clamitz v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., ibid.
6 Op. cit. supra note 1.
1 358 U.S. 121 (1958).
2 A statute allowing the United States the right of direct appeal where an informa-
tion is dismissed on the basis of statutory construction.
8 Informations numbered 252-56 and 261-56.
4 A & P Trucking Co. was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 835 and 49 U.S.C.
§ 322(a) ; Hopla Trucking Co. was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 835.
6 Both cases were consolidated for argument.
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